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COMBATTING SOFTWARE PIRACY:
CAN FELONY PENALTIES FOR COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT CURTAIL THE COPYING OF
COMPUTER SOFTWARE?
Greg Shortt
I. INTRODUCTION
By 1990, software piracy' in the United States accounted for ap-
proximately $2.4 billion in lost income per year for software manufac-
turers,2 up from approximately $500 million per year a decade ago.3
Worldwide, the losses are estimated to have been $10-12 billion in
1990.4 This dramatic rise in software piracy over the past decade not
only created a burgeoning business in pirated software and resulted in
dwindling profits for the software industry, but it also prompted re-
newed efforts by software manufacturers and the federal government
to combat the pirating of software. The combination of industry and
government efforts culminated in Public Law Number 102-561,1
Copyright © 1994 Greg Short.
t B.S., Kent University, U.K., 1984; M.A., Virginia Tech., 1986; J.D., Santa Clara Uni-
versity School of Law, 1994.
1. The term "software piracy" has been used to refer to the unauthorized copying and
distribution of software programs as well as the unauthorized creation of derivative works based
on the software. See Lauren Bruzzone, Comment, Copyright and License Protection for Com-
puter Programs: A Market Oriented Assessment, 11 PACE LAW REvmw 303, 310 n.49 (1991).
However, for the purposes of this comment and the recently enacted legislation discussed herein,
"software piracy" refers only to the reproduction of software and the subsequent distribution of
any copies, not the practice of reverse-engineering or the development of derivative programs.
2. Software Piracy: SPA Hails Felonization Bill, EDGE: WORK GROUP CoMPUTNG R-
PORT, Vol. 3, No. 105 (Oct. 19, 1992), available in LEXIS, ALLCMP file [hereinafter Feloniza-
tion]. Gail Penner, testifying for the Software Publishers Association before the House Judiciary
Committee on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration, quoted these same figures. See
Stricter Criminal Penalties for Software Infringement Debated Before House, Daily Rep. for
Executives (BNA) at D-1I (Aug. 13, 1992). The losses were up from an estimated $1.6 billion
in 1989, see 138 CONG. REc. S17,958, S17,959 (1992) (statement of Sen. Hatch) [hereinafter
Hatch].
3. Julie A. Mark, Software Copying Policies: The Next Step In Piracy Prevention?, 2 J.L.
& TEcH. 43, 43 (1987).
4. Felonization, supra note 2.
5. An Act to Amend Title 18, United State Codes, to Impose Criminal Sanctions for
Violation of Software Copyright, Pub. L. No. 102-561, 106 Stat. 4233 (1992) (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 2319 (1988 & 1992 Supp.)).
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signed into law by President Bush on October 28, 1992.6 The new
legislation, which was the focus of intense lobbying by the Software
Publishers Association (SPA),7 creates felony penalties for software
pirates.
This comment first reviews the background of the software
piracy problem: analyzing who copies software and why, assessing
what is the impact of this pirating on the software industry, and exam-
ining past attempts by manufacturers to prevent piracy. Second, it
traces the development of the recently enacted legislation. Third, the
comment evaluates the reaction to the legislation by software manu-
facturers and consumers, and further debates the law's utility as a tool
to combat software piracy.
II. SoFrwmRE PIRACY
People who copy software can be grouped into three broad cate-
gories: organized pirates, individual computer owners/users, and cor-
porate employers/employees. Each category has its own motivation
for copying software.' Organized pirates copy on a large scale pri-
marily for profit with the software frequently sold through pirate elec-
tronic bulletin boards systems (BBSs).9 Individual computer owners,
motivated by a desire to avoid paying for software, generally copy for
personal use in the home, school or business from software received
from friends or colleagues. Corporate copiers, who some commenta-
tors acknowledge are the most unmanageable piracy problem, 10 in-
clude individuals in the work-place who copy, with or without
management approval, software that may or may not be licensed by
the company. Often called "soft-lifting,"'" employers may condone or
ignore employee copying of software, rationalizing it as part of the
business or justifying it on the grounds that the company has already
6. Bush Signs Bill on Criminal Penalties for Copyright, Pat. Trademark & Copyright L.
Daily (BNA) (Oct. 30, 1992) [hereinafter Bush Signs Bill].
7. Felonization, supra note 2. The SPA is one of the principal trade associations of the
personal computer software industry.
8. For an assessment of the ethics, investment, reputation and detection concerns of these
groups and their piracy threat, see generally DANI. T. BROOKS, COMPUTER LAW BASICS (1985).
9. Charles Cangialosi, The Electronic Underground: Computer Piracy and Electronic
Bulletin Boards, 15 Rtnrars CoMpUrER & TECH. LJ. 265, 287-88 (1989).
[Note: Alternative terms for BBS (bulletin board system) are EBB (electronic bulletin
board) and CBB (computer bulletin board).]
10. See, e.g., Amy Cortese, A Felonious Crime: Software Copyright Infringement, IN.
FORMATIONWEEK, Sept. 14, 1992, at 14, in which Ron Palenski, general counsel for Information
Technology Association of America, commented that software piracy is mostly within
corporations.
11. Software "Police" Pursue Pirates, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1992, at CI [hereinafter
Software Police].
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licensed one copy of the software.12 At other times, employers may
have little knowledge about the making of copies, especially if the
office computers are not networked or audited.
Organized pirates aside, those in the individual and corporate cat-
egories often copy because they do not understand their legal obliga-
tions regarding copyrighted software.' 3 At other times, those who do
understand their obligations copy anyway, either because they believe
that there is little chance of being caught, or because they consider it a
fringe benefit of their job to make a copy either for their computer at
work or at home.14 For pirates at all levels, the attraction is further
enhanced because it is very quick and inexpensive to copy software,
requiring only the cost of a blank disk and a few minutes to download
the program.' 5 If software piracy is inexpensive, easy and difficult to
detect, manufacturers, in their drive to make software more readily
available, unwittingly contributed to the piracy problem. 6 In the
1970s, most software was custom-made for use on mainframes and
marketed through direct sales; the manufacturer maintained a close
relationship with the licensee, provided updates to the software when
required, and experienced little demand for copies of the specialized
software. 17 In contrast, by the 1980s, as corporate and personal own-
ership and use of microcomputers increased dramatically, generic
software for the PC or workstation was available at retail or wholesale
outlets; few buyers or users had any relationship with the manufac-
turer, the software needed little or no support, and there was a wide
demand for copies of the programs.' 8
One result of this dramatic change in the computing environment
has been the exponential growth in software piracy. The SPA esti-
mates that one out of every five PC software programs is now an ille-
gal copy.' 9 Software piracy of this scale translates into a reduction in
12. Robert G. Sterne & Edward J. Kessler, An Overview of Corporate Copying Policies in
Corporate America, 1 J.L. & TFCH. 157, 160 (1986).
13. Mark, supra note 3, at 44.
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Bruzzone, supra note 1, at 311.
16. Steme & Kessler, supra note 12, at 160.
17. For a description of the bifurcation of the computer program market, see Bruzzone,
supra note 1, at 307-09.
18. Id. at 308-09.
19. Rob Kelly, Corporate Pirates Walk the Plank, IN'FoManAmoNWEEK, Nov. 9, 1992, at
30; see also Patrick G. Marshall, Copying Computer Programs Puts Byte on Software Firms,
MenNEAPOLmS STAR Tam., July 1, 1993, at 16E.
Senator Biden, in his report to the Senate from the Committee on the Judiciary that debated
the proposed legislation, contended that studies indicated that "for every authorized copy of a
software program in circulation, there is an illegal copy also in circulation." See S. PEP. No.
268, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1992).
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profits for manufacturers, a reduction in money available for invest-
ment and research in new products, and, consequently, more expen-
sive software for the consumer.20 In response to this syphoning of
their profits, manufacturers have responded with a variety of innova-
tive methods to prevent the pirating of software.
III. EFFORTS TO CURTAIL PIRACY
A. License Protection
Most software in the United States is licensed by the manufac-
turer or distributor rather than sold out right to the consumer.21 Li-
censing arrangements include formal contracts between manufacturers
and licensees, "shrink-wrap" licenses that come with software
purchased retail or wholesale, and registration fees for the use of
"shareware" downloaded from BBSs. Each license usually refers to a
single copy or multiple copies of the software and the license is gener-
ally for the use of the copy or copies by the licensee only. By licens-
ing copies of the software, the manufacturer seeks to avoid the "first
sale doctrine" of the Copyright Act22 and to prevent the licensee from
transferring or lending the software to others who may duplicate it and
thereby reduce the manufacturer's potential revenue.23
However, it is not an infringement of copyright for the licensee
of a software program to copy or adapt that software for either an
essential step in using the program or for archival purposes. 24 Most
manufacturers agree that the making of an archival copy by the licen-
see for disaster recovery purposes does not present a piracy problem,
and manufacturers generally give the licensee permission to make ar-
20. Mark, supra note 3, at 43-44.
21. David A. Rice, Licensing the Use of Computer Program Copies and the Copyright Act
First Sale Doctrine, 30 JuRnmAncs J. L. Sci. & TECH. 157, 157 (1990). Note that most licensed
software is object code rather than source code. Technically speaking, object code is the machine
readable code that is compiled from the human readable source code in which the software is
developed; more simply, the software developer writes the software program in a programming
language that is then run through a compiler to convert the program into the binary code that can
be read by the computer. See Bruzzone, supra note 1, at 315. By providing only the object code
to the licensee, the manufacturer ensures that the user cannot decipher the software unless it is
converted back or, essentially, reverse engineered. See James A. Eidelman & Corol R. Shep-
herd, Living Among Pirates: Practical Strategies to Protect Computer Software, 65 MIcH. BJ.
284, 284-85 (1986). -,
22. 17 U.S.C.S. § 109(a) (1993). This doctrine gives to the owner of a copy of a copy-
righted work the right to transfer or dispose of that copy. However, under § 109(c), those rights
do not extend to the lease of a copyrighted work. For a broad discussion of the first sale doc-
trine, see generally Rice, supra note 21.
23. David L. Hayes, Shrink-wrap License Agreements: New Light on a Vexing Problem, 7
CoMpurrR L. Assoc. BuLL., No. 2 at 5, 5-6 (1992).
24. 17 U.S.C.S. § 117 (1993).
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chival copies or provide the licensee with extra copies for such pur-
poses.' On the other hand, adapting the software usually requires the
source code, but manufacturers rarely distribute this to a licensee.26
Alternatively, a licensee can adapt the software through reverse-engi-
neering, but most licensors specifically preclude the licensees the right
to reverse-engineer.2 7
For example, the shrink-wrap license has traditionally been used
to protect the manufacturer's interest and to inform the buyer of the
limits on the copying of the software sold through retail or wholesale
outlets.28 The software package exposes the license and a notice in-
forming the buyer that by opening the package the buyer agrees to the
terms of the license.29 Despite of the doubts raised about the enforce-
ability of shrink-wrap licenses,30 manufacturers still use them because
they remain an accepted industry standard. Furthermore, in an attempt
to counter the argument by consumers that they did not see the shrink-
wrap license and did not agree to its terms, some manufacturers reiter-
ate the buyer's acceptance of the license agreement at the logon
screen.
3 1
Thus, the main advantages to licensing software lie in the manu-
facturer's ability to retain title to the software and to restrict the privi-
leges of the licensee.32 In addition, licensing gives the manufacturer
two potential causes of action if a licensee pirates the software: copy-
right infringement and/or breach of contract.33  However, past at-
tempts to enforce these civil contractual and/or copyright rights have
25. The law does not explicitly require that the user be permitted to make the archival
copies or that the user should look to the manufacturer as the source of archival copies. See
Sterne & Kessler, supra note 12, at 161-62.
26. See Eidelman & Shepherd supra note 21, at 285.
27. Rice, supra note 21, at 157-58. Note that making a copy of a licensed program for the
purposes of reverse engineering is considered fair use; see, e.g., Sega Enter. Ltd. v. Accolade,
Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1561, 1578 (9th Cir. 1992); Atari Games Corp. v.
Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1015, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
28. Sterne & Kessler, supra note 12, at 165-66.
29. The shrink-wrap package may also contain a registration card for the licensee to return
to the manufacturer acknowledging agreement to the license terms, but few of these are returned.
Id. at 164-65. For a sample of a shrink-wrap license, see, Eidelman & Shepherd, supra note 21,
at 291.
30. For an analysis of the Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir.
1988), and Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., No. 88-7961, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11320 (E.D. Penn. Sept. 26, 1989), cases, and their impact upon the protection of computer
software, see Hayes, supra note 23, at 6-10.
31. Eidelman & Shepherd, supra note 21, at 288.
32. 1d at 287.
33. Id.
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not always been successful in combatting software piracy. 4 Indeed,
the image of software protection through licensing has become a frag-
mented one consisting of overlapping theories of intellectual property
law and contract law, and the recent lobbying for reforms to the Copy-
right Act was prompted by software manufacturers convinced that ex-
isting protection was insufficient to prevent piracy.
B. Hardware and Software Protection
Originally, many software manufacturers looked to hardware
protection as a barrier to duplication of their software, such as copy-
protected disks or devices attached to the computer which prevented
copying of the disk.35 The Association of Data Processing Service
Organizations (ADAPSO) introduced a "lock, ring and key" approach
in the early 1980s, but this was soon abandoned by most manufactur-
ers because it was too costly to implement and maintain.36
Hardware protection also threatened consumer good will. Many
customers were offended that they were considered potential pirates,
while others complained about delays when forced to contact the man-
ufacturer for a replacement disk or to make an archival copy of the
software.3 7 In addition, hardware protection devices quickly spawned
innovators who decoded or bypassed the various locks.38 Instead, a
modem approach is to employ software protection, such as licensee
IDs embedded in the software that display every time the program is
run.39 These have the added advantage of assisting manufacturers to
trace the source of pirated copies.40
C. Distribution Arrangements
Other efforts to curtail software piracy have focused on the pack-
aging of the software. These efforts include the printing of warnings
of the penalties for infringement of the license and copyright, and the
34. For example, recent court decisions have cast doubt about the validity and enforceabil-
ity of shrink-wrap licenses (see Hayes supra note 23, at 6-10) and created concern about what
software features are copyrightable. For a discussion of copyright protection of computer
software, see generally Evan Finkel, Copyright Protection for Computer Software in the Nine.
ties, 7 SArA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. LJ. 201 (1991); for a discussion of the
copyrightability of the "look and feel" of software in the U.S., see generally Daniel A.D. Hunter,
Protecting the Look and Feel of Computer Software In the United States and Australia, 7 SANTA
CLAm COMPUTER & HIGH TEmC. LJ. 95 (1991).
35. Mark, supra note 3, at 44-45.
36. Id at 45.
37. Id.
38. Id
39. Eidelman & Shepherd, supra note 21, at 285.
40. Id.
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insertion of a hologram that identifies the software as an original man-
ufacturer copy. Nevertheless, forged holograms have been found in-
serted into packages containing pirated copies.41 A more standard
approach to curtailing software piracy through distribution arrange-
ments has been for manufacturers to deny support and upgrade facili-
ties to users of software unless the user can point to a license
agreement, produce a registration card from a shrink-wrap purchase,
or agree to pay a license fee.42
D. Software Copying Policies
Educating consumers about the potential liability for copying
software was a major thrust of ADAPSO's anti-pirate strategy in the
1980s.43 Companies sought to implement internal corporate policies
on legitimate software copying in the work place, thereby hoping to
reduce or eliminate unauthorized copying at the office and to mini-
mize the corporations' exposure to liability for their employees' ac-
tions.44 ADAPSO even drafted a five point software copying policy
entitled 'Thou Shall Not Dupe" and distributed the proposal through-
out the industry.'
While such a policy may not completely insulate a corporate em-
ployer from liability for copying done by its employees,46 under the
doctrine of respondeat superior, it has been argued that corporate di-
rectors and counsels are under a duty to adopt such policies.47 In con-
trast, one reviewer of such policies suggests that the onus for limiting
piracy in the software market lies with improved publisher services
41. Mark Clifford, Pirate's Lair: Taiwan's Software Copiers Perfect the Hologram, FAR
EAST R EcoN. REv., Oct. 8, 1992, at 79.
42. A novel approach has been pursued by McAfee & Associates, a Santa Clara, Califor-
nia, firm, whose motto has been "Steal our Software." McAfee distributes its software, mainly
anti-viral programs, as shareware on BBSs, and includes a requirement that corporations using
the software must license it. However, McAfee also relies on individuals to download the pro-
grams, and share them with their colleagues at the office, who will in turn make more copies of
the program, without licensing the software. McAfee then contacts the company, informs them
that they have unlicensed copies of its software and requests a license fee for the use of the
software in order for the company to avoid any infringement liability. At other times, an audit
by a company of its network will reveal unlicensed copies of the programs, and the company will
contact McAfee for a license. In other words, McAfee relies on user honesty and/or the fear of
litigation to secure licenses from those corporations who have pirated, perhaps unwittingly, its
software. See Laurie D. Weeks, McAfee, Maker of Antiviral Software, Plans Offering to Build
on Its Success, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 1992, at A5D.
43. Sterne & Kessler, supra note 12, at 170-01.
44. Id. at 171-73.
45. Cangialosi, supra note 9, at 291.
46. Steme & Kessler, supra note 12, at 171-72.
47. Beth K. Eiseman, A Survey of Copying Policy in Corporate America: The Corporate
Director's Study of Care and the Software Copying Policy, 2 J.L. & TEcH. 69, 69-70 (1987).
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and better licensing agreements, rather than on software copying poli-
cies, because "corporate users would be more willing to respect the
requirement that each copy of a program be legitimately purchased if
the manufacturers tailor their products and services to the particular
needs of the corporations."48
IV. IMFFECTrWNESS OF ANrI-PmACY EFFORTS
By the late 1980s, the perception was that these contractual, tech-
nical and educational efforts were insufficient to stem the tide of
software piracy. Despite preliminary concerns of expense and poten-
tial customer alienation, the software manufacturers, headed by
ADAPSO, SPA and the Business Software Association (BSA), began
to utilize litigation more readily as a means to combat piracy.49
ADAPSO's first suits for software copying were filed in the mid-
1980s and targeted high profile corporations whose employees were
known to be copying software.5 0 While the goal was to expose and
publicize the copying problem, most suits were settled." The SPA's
first suit was filed in 1988.52 Since that time the SPA has organized a
group of attorneys nationwide who by 1992 had filed over 300 copy-
right infringement lawsuits for software copying, 3 with the cost of the
enforcement program supported by contributions from SPA's
membership. 4
Sometime referred to as the "Software Police,"55 the SPA's ap-
proach is to identify suspect companies and obtain court orders al-
lowing the them to search the offices and seize any non-licensed
copies of software. 6 Tips about companies with pirated software in-
variably come from disgruntled or former employees calling the
SPA's hotline,57 or from unsuspecting users of pirated software call-
ing the manufacturer's customer support number.58 Prior to the recent
48. Mark, supra note 3, at 62.
49. Id. at 49.
50. Sterne & Kessler, supra note 12, at 169.
51. Id.
52. Susan Kostal, Business Booms for Software Police, L.A. DAILY J., Oct. 9, 1991, at A7.
53. Software Police, supra note 11.
54. Kostal, supra note 52. The SPA has over 1000 members, including IBM, Apple and
Microsoft.
55. Software Police, supra note 11.
56. Kostal, supra note 52.
57. Software Police, supra note 11. The SPA gets approximately 100 calls a week on its
hotline, while the BSA gets over 250 calls per day on numerous international hotlines. See
Karen Kaplan, Industry Groups Unleash "Software Cops" to Fight Piracy, ARmONA REP., Aug.
16, 1993, at B1.
58. Sterne & Kessler, supra note 12, at 169.
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amendments to the Copyright Act, the SPA could force companies to
destroy all illegal copies and collect fines for each copyright viola-
tion.5 9 However, their strategy was to settle with a company once it
purchased legitimate copies of the software.60
BSA, founded in 1988, is an association of some of the largest
personal computer software publishers in the United States, including
Digital Research, Lotus Development Corporation, Microsoft Corpo-
ration and Word Perfect Corporation. BSA has targeted international
pirates in a strategy similar to SPA, but it focuses on bringing criminal
charges and putting pressure on local legislators and enforcement offi-
cials. 6 ' For example, in April 1990, BSA brought 20 suits against
software pirates in Spain, but later that year announced an amnesty
period to allow those companies to request a license and an out-of-
court settlement.62 About half of BSA's suits are against corpora-
tions,63 and although BSA has yet to raid any corporations in the
United States, ' BSA has begun targeting BBSs based in the United
States and abroad that distribute pirated software.65
This movement away from prevention and education toward the
pursuit of pirates in the courts reflected both the exasperation of
software manufacturers with traditional techniques for curtailing
software piracy and a commitment to more strong-arm tactics.66 At
the same time, representatives of the software manufacturers lobbied
Congress for stiffer laws to deal with pirates by arguing that existing
penalties and remedies for copyright infringement were insufficient to
deter software pirates,67 that federal prosecutors and law enforcement
agencies were reluctant to pursue cases that only resulted in misde-
meanor convictions,68 and that discovery procedures for civil com-
plaints were often inadequate to garner sufficient evidence to
59. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 57.
60. See, e.g., Kostal, supra note 52.
61. Softvare Alliance Announces Amnesty for Computer Software Pirates in Spain, 7 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No.45 at 1742 (Nov. 14, 1990).
62. Id.
63. Kelly, supra note 19.
64. Id.
65. Ellen Messmer, Trade Group Takes Aim at BBS Villains, NmrwouK WORLD, Nov. 30,
1992, at 8.
66. In response, many corporations who have been targets of the manufacturers pursuit
have attacked these operations as witch hunts. Kaplan, supra note 57.
67. See, e.g., Felonization, supra note 2.
68. ld.; see also S. REP. No. 268, supra note 19, at 2 (comparing the current disinclination
of prosecutors to prosecute software piracy cases with a similar situation that existed with sound
recordings before Congress changed the copyright laws to help deter piracy in that industry).
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successfully sue the pirates.69 This lobby for stricter penalties was
represented in Congress by Senator Orrin Hatch (Republican, Utah)
and Representative William J. Hughes (Democrat, New Jersey).
V. DEVELOPMENT OF FELONY LEGISLATION
A. Proposed Law
Under section 506(a) of the Copyright Act, criminal infringement
of a copyright is punishable according to the provisions of section
2319 of Title 18.70 Section 2319 originally provided felony penalties
of up to 5 years in prison and/or fines of up to $250,000 for infringing
copyrighted motion pictures, sound recordings or other audiovisual
works (depending upon the number of copies made of each type of
copyrighted work), but infringement of other copyrighted works was
only a misdemeanor punishable by up to a year in prison and/or a
$25,000 fine.7 1 In April 1991, Senator Hatch introduced Senate Bill
893 (S. 893) to add computer programs to the list of copyrighted
works that can trigger criminal penalties for copyright infringement
under § 2319.72
B. Legislative History
The Senate Judiciary Committee referred the bill to its Subcom-
mittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks, which approved the
bill for consideration by the full Committee on July 25, 1991.73 The
Judiciary Committee unanimously approved S. 893 on August 1,
1991. 74 The full Senate passed the bill on June 4, 1992,75 and the bill
then moved to the House.
69. House Panel Considers Stricter Criminal Penalties for Software Infringement, Pat.
Trademark & Copyright L. Daily (1BNA) (Aug. 28, 1992) [hereinafter House Considers
Penalties].
70. "Criminal Infringement. Any person who infringes a copyright willfully and for pur-
poses of commercial advantage or private financial gain shall be punished as provided in section
2319 of title 18." 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
71. Bush Signs Bill, supra note 6. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b) (1988).
72. S. 893, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). The bill's purpose was to "amend Title 18 of the
United States Code to increase the penalties for violations of copyrights in computer software.
Under current law, piracy of computer software is a misdemeanor offense. This bill will elevate
the offense to a felony." S. RaP. No. 268, supra note 19, at 2. Note that the bill's provisions
were also included as part of the omnibus crime package. H.R. REP. No. 997, 102d Cong., 2d
Sess. 2 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3569, 3570.
73. S. REP. No. 268, supra note 19.
74. Id. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary did not issue its report on the bill until
April 7, 1992. See H.R. REP. No. 997, supra note 72, at 1, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3569.
75. House Passes Bill on Criminal Penalties for Copyright Infringement, 44 Pat. Trade-
mark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1100, at 601 (Oct. 8, 1992) [hereinafter House Passes Bill].
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The House Judiciary Committee referred the bill to its Subcom-
mittee on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration on June
11, 1992, which held hearings on the bill on August 12, 1992.76 On
September 10, 1992, the Subcommittee approved a modified version
of the bill that extended the proposed felony provisions for software
infringement to infringement of all types of copyrighted works and
standardized the number and value of infringing copies of the various
works required for criminal liability.7 7
This amended version was passed by the full House on October
3, 1992, and returned to the Senate for approval.78 On October 8,
1992, the Senate unanimously agreed to the amendments, and the bill
was sent to the President.79 President Bush signed the bill into law on
October 28, 1992.80
C. Amended Law
Under the newly adopted legislation, a person who "willfully and
for purposes of commercial advantage or financial gain" reproduces or
distributes within a 180-day period at least 10 copies of one or more
copyrighted software programs that have a retail value of at least
$2,500, faces imprisonment of up to five years and a fine of $250,000
for a first offense, and up to 10 years imprisonment for a second
offense.8 '
VI. LEGISLATIVE DEBATES
In his speech to the Senate advocating the adoption of the
House's amended version of the bill, Senator Hatch described the pro-
posed law as "designed to help the computer software industry combat
the growing problems of large-scale commercial piracy." 2 However,
despite the contentions by the legislation's drafters and supporters that
only organized pirates were the target of the new law, other commen-
tators continue to argue that the majority of software piracy occurs in
the corporate setting. 3 In fact, as described earlier, it is the corpora-
tions who are frequently the target of the software manufacturer ef-
forts to combat software piracy. This contradiction raises the question
of whether the law is simply focused on derailing large-scale software
76. H.R. REP. No. 997, supra note 72, at 2, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3570.
77. Id. at 2-3, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3570-71.
78. House Passes Bill, supra note 75.
79. Id
80. Bush Signs Bill, supra note 6.
81. Pub. L. No. 102-561, 106 Stat. 4233 (1992).
82. Hatch, supra note 2, at S17,958.
83. Cortese, supra note 10.
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piracy, or whether it can be used to target corporate pirates or even
individual pirates.
Some early comments about the new law's potential reach raised
concerns about whether the law could be used against companies with
multiple unlicensed copies of a program,84 companies employing re-
verse-engineering techniques,"5 individuals making copies for their
friends,8 6 system operators of BBSs that provide pirate copies, or, pos-
sibly, even users of those BBSs.s7 In evaluating these concerns, the
Congressional committees focused on two main issues that are neces-
sary to trigger criminal penalties for software piracy: 1) the threshold
requirements for the number and value of copies, and 2) the mens rea
requirement.
A. Mens Rea Requirement
Some of the concerns raised by the new felony legislation
stemmed from the lack of definition for the terms "willful," "commer-
cial advantage," and "private financial gain" when determining crimi-
nal copyright infringement. Although section 506(a) has been part of
the Copyright Act since 1976 and "willful" has been in the copyright
law since 1897, the term has never been defined in the Act.88 This
inadequacy of definition was seen by both opponents and proponents
of the new legislation as making it possible, at least theoretically, for
criminal liability to be imposed on corporate or individual copiers of
software in addition to organized pirates.8 9
In an attempt to flush out the mens rea requirement for the crime,
Senator Hatch, in his speech to the Senate advocating adoption of the
new legislation, stressed that "unless done for the express purpose of
obtaining commercial advantage or private financial gain, copying of
copyrighted material is not a crime" under the new law. 90 Although
this comment did little more than restate the requirements of the law,
Representative Brooks, in his speech to the House on October 3, 1992,
before the bill went to the House vote, stated:
84. Shawn Willet, Mixed Reaction to Software Copyright Law, INFowoRLD, Oct. 19, 1992,
at 17; Rory J. O'Connor, Congress Votes to Make Software Piracy a Felony, SAN Jose MERCURY
NEws, Oct. 10, 1992, at Eli, E15.
85. House Considers Penalties, supra note 69.
86. Id.
87. Messmer, supra note 65. Ilene Rosenthal, director of litigation for the SPA, hinted that
the SPA's approach of targeting only BBS operators might change to include users. See Mar-
shall, supra note 19.
88. H.R. REP. No. 997, supra note 72, at 5, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3573.
89. House Considers Penalties, supra note 69; Willet, supra note 84; O'Connor, supra
note 84.
90. Hatch, supra note 2, at S17,959.
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The requirement of a mens rea for criminal copyright infringement
serves the important purpose of drawing a sharp distinction with
civil copyright infringement.... For an infringement to be deemed
a criminal violation... a specific mens rea must be proved. Even
if civil liability has been established, without the requisite mens rea
it does not matter how many unauthorized copies ... have been
made or distributed: No criminal violation has occurred.9 1
Still, despite criticism about the lack of definition, the standards
required to prove criminal infringement of copyright have been well
articulated by the courts.92 Generally, as applies to § 506(a), "willful"
infringement requires that the act be voluntary, with knowledge that it
was prohibited by law, and with the intent of violating the law.93 Fur-
thermore, as emphasized, "the copying must be undertaken to make
money, and even incidental financial benefits" are insufficient where
the "achievement of those benefits were not the motivation behind the
copying."94 In other words, infringements must be undertaken for
profit, although it is not necessary for the infringer to receive actual
commercial advantage or private financial gain.95 Therefore, concern
that innocent copying of software could be criminally prosecuted is
unnecessary because the government can only bring a criminal action
for willful infringement.96
Nonetheless, in an effort to calm concern about distinguishing
criminal from civil infringement, the House Subcommittee on Intellec-
tual Property and Judicial Administration attempted to add a definition
of "willful" infringement to S. 893, but this was rejected by the House
Judiciary Committee.97 While applauding this move, which placed
continued reliance on the courts' interpretation of the willful element
of the offense, Senator Hatch added that he was sure Congress would
be willing to define the term better in the future98 - perhaps hinting
that Congress would be prepared to amend the law in order to define
its reach more clearly if the current terminology proves unmanageable
in the courts. 99
91. H.R. Rm. No. 997, supra note 72, at 5, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3573.
92. See generally, 3 MELV.LE B. NmMER & DAVID NimmER, NIMMER ON COPYMRGHT,
§ 15.01 (1993).
93. Id. § 15.01, at 15-8 & n.13.
94. Hatch, supra note 2 at S17,959.
95. NnamR, supra note 92, § 15.01, at 15-8. See also United States v. Moore, 604 F.2d
1228, 1235 (9th Cir. 1979).
96. NmiMmE, supra note 92, at 15-7.
97. Hatch, supra note 2, at S17,959.
98. Id.
99. Another example of the concern over the language of the bill came during the hearings
before the House Subcommittee when Rep. Hughes asked whether specific language excluding
reverse engineering should be added to the bill. Industry representatives and attorneys argued
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B. Threshold Requirements
Another main cause for concern lies in the low threshold require-
ment of "10 copies" with a "retail value" of "$2,500" that can trigger
criminal liability. The legislative history indicates that the "retail
value" is to be determined by the retail price of the software at its time
of release, or, for a non-retail program, by the harm to the copyright
holder (assessed as the greater of the replacement cost or the true cost
of the production of the software)."° In clarifying this calculation,
Senator Hatch noted that these figures are to be determined by the
value of the software in the legitimate retail market, not in the
"thieves' criminal market."10' 1 However, although the legislation re-
quires "at least 10 copies" of one or more copyrighted works, Senator
Hatch pointed out that "criminal liability attaches if fewer than 10
works are copied if the retail value of the works exceeds $2,500," but
imprisonment in such a case cannot exceed one year.102
Thus, it will be important to see how the courts evaluate the suffi-
ciency of the evidence required to prove criminal liability once the
required intent has been shown. For example, with business or per-
sonal software programs often costing more than $250, it is possible
that a half-dozen or more copies of a program could bring the copier
under the reach of the felony legislation, if the mens rea requirement
is met. However, the courts have been careful when finding criminal
liability for pirating other copyright works. In United States v.
Cross, ' 3 the court found willful intent to infringe for private financial
gain, but found insufficient evidence of the exact number of copies of
the infringing videocassettes then required to trigger criminal liability.
The felony convictions were vacated.
The suggestion that fewer than 10 copies are required to trigger
felony penalties could be interpreted as an attempt by Congress to
avoid the rejection of an action by the courts, similar to that in Cross,
when all the requirements for felony software infringement have been
met except the exact threshold number of copies. Nonetheless, Rep-
resentative Brooks took care to point out that the threshold require-
ments were not intended to produce a broad net within which to catch
all types of copiers:
that such language was unnecessary because reverse engineering would not fall under the statute.
See House Considers Penalties, supra note 69.
100. See Hatch, supra note 2, at S17,958.
101. Id. at S17,959.
102. Id. (emphasis added).
103. 816 F.2d 297, 301 (7th Cir. 1987).
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First, it excludes from felony prosecution children making copies
for friends as well as other incidental copying of copyrighted works
having a relatively low value. Second, the requirements of repro-
ducing or distributing at least 10 copies within a 180 day period
removes the possibility that the increased penalties... can be used
as a tool of harassment in business disputes over reverse
engineering.
°4
VII. TARGETING THE PIRATES
A. Commercial Pirates
According to the SPA, "the new law passed by Congress . ..
targets professional software pirates who make many copies of
software and resell them at low prices; illegal bulletin board operators
who distribute pirated software; and PC dealers who offer 'free' but
illegal software to hardware purchasers."'0" This claim is supported
by recent activity by SPA, BSA and federal criminal agencies. In
what was considered to be the first action under the new legislation,
the Secret Service in December 1992, raided the dormitory rooms of
two Texas Tech University students who were alleged to have traded
pirated software on the Internet computer network using the Univer-
sity's computers.'0 6 In another investigation in Texas, the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation was working with" the SPA to target computer
stores in Houston that gave or sold pirated software to buyers of hard-
ware." 7 Meanwhile, the BSA, with the support of federal law en-
forcement agencies, was actively pursuing BBSs that sold pirated
software.10 8
Perhaps the most publicized event was the announcement of the
first criminal indictments under the new law in June and July 1993.109
In one case, the federal grand jury in San Francisco charged a com-
pany and two executives with copyright infringement for distributing
some 20,000 copies of Microsoft software, as well as with laundering
over $500,000 in illicit profits." 0 In another case, a computer hard-
104. H.R. REP. No. 997, supra note 72, at 6, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3574.
105. Anti-Piracy Hotline Helps Nab Software Bootleggers, $3.9 Million in Fines Levied,
PRESENTATION PRODUCTS MAGAZIN, Mar. 1993, at 10 [hereinafter Anti-Piracy Hotline].
106. Joe Abernathy, Federal Agents Raid Dorm, Seize Computer Equipment, HoUsTrON
CHRON., Dec. 17, 1992, at A40.
107. Joe Abernathy, Houston Retailers Target of Software Pirating Probe, HouSTON
CHRON., Jan. 15, 1993, at DI.
108. See, e.g., Sofnvare Alliance Announces Campaign To Shut Down Illegal Bulletin
Boards, Pat. Trademark & Copyright L. Daily (BNA) (Nov. 25, 1992).
109. New Software Piracy Law Leads to First Indictments, S.F. DAmY J., June 29, 1993, at
2; Landmark Piracy Charges Are Brought, S.F. DAMY J., July 8, 1993, at 2.
110. First Felony Indictments Issued for Software Piracy, L.A. TrMES, July 8, 1993, at D2.
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ware company and two executives were indicted after selling
thousands of copies of Microsoft software to federal and state
agents.11
These activities suggest that not only is the new law operating as
intended, but also that law enforcement agencies are more willing to
pursue copyright infringement. This latter fact was endorsed by the
new United States Attorney for the Northern District of California,
Michael Yamaguchi, who said that he wants to bring more software
piracy and copyright infringement suits.112 On the other hand, the re-
cent indictments handed down by his office were criticized as being
gift-wrapped by Microsoft investigators and, as such, reflect a worri-
some hand-in-glove relationship between Microsoft and the District
Attorney's office." 3 Ironically, Microsoft complained that the gov-
ernment was not tough enough on the pirates, leaving behind too
many machines for duplicating software when they raided the
premises." 4
B. Corporations
Despite the Congressional protestations to the contrary, it is too
early to determine whether large-scale pirates will be the only targets
of the new law. In contrast to SPA's claims about the legislation's
target, the SPA has overwhelmingly targeted corporations in its civil
actions against software pirates-approximately 95% of its cases last
year." 5 Indeed, the SPA's typical investigation centers on a company
with 20 to 30 PCs, but the SPA has sued companies with as few as
five PCs." 6
This focus occurs because the SPA relies in part on calls to its
hotline for information on corporate pirates and recently there have
been few reports on large companies, a trend the SPA attributes to
most corporations having instituted software copying policies or uti-
lized software managers to control the software on the network.' 1 7
For those corporations that have not instituted such policies, the possi-
bility of criminal liability for software copying is very real. Generally,
a corporation is liable for the criminal conduct of its agents, including
111. Jim Doyle & Don Clark, Firms Pirated Software, U.S. Says, S.F. CHRON., July 8,
1993, at A13.
112. Reynolds Holding & Jim Doyle, U.S. Attorney Shuffles Staff, Sets Goals, S.F. CHRON.,
July 7, 1993, at A13.
113. Howard Mintz, Too Close For Comfort, RECORDER, Aug. 9, 1993, at 1.
114. Id.
115. Anti-Piracy Hotline, supra note 105.
116. Hard Line on Software Piracy, CHicAGo TRm., Apr. 25, 1993, at Ell.
117. IL
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officers and employees, committed in the scope of their employment
and on behalf of the corporation.118
For example, would the test for criminal infringement be met if a
corporation's officers, for the purpose of avoiding further expenses in
the coming quarter, condoned its employees making a dozen copies of
a $300 licensed software program, of which only 2 are permissible for
archival or operative purposes? Arguably, the corporation has repro-
duced 10 illegal copies having a retail value of $3,000 within 90 days,
and acted knowingly in violation of its license agreement with the
intent to profit from the act. Under Senator Hatch's reading of the
new law, perhaps even 9 illegal copies worth only $2,700 would be
sufficient.
The legislative history of the new law provides no clear direction
for such a scenario because, surprisingly, the issue of respondeat su-
perior was not raised at the committee hearings. 1 9 However, it is not
unreasonable to assume that the law could be used by the software
manufacturers to threaten corporations whose possession of illegal
copies, both in actual number and retail value, are near or above the
threshold levels, even if litigation is not ultimately pursued. Indeed,
considering the success of software manufacturers in civil actions for
software piracy,' 20 corporations would do well to heed the SPA's at-
tempts to help companies stay within the new law by offering them
free network audit kits, software management programs and videos
explaining copyright law. 121
C. Individuals
In presenting the proposed legislation for final approval before
the senate, Senator Hatch stated that "this criminal statute is not
designed to reach instances of permissible, private home copying,"' 22
but he did not say what such copying entailed or whether the law
could reach instances of impermissible home copying. For example,
if an individual makes 10 copies of a $300 program and sells them to
his friends, it is unclear whether this activity would pass the test for
criminal infringement. While observers consider that any incidental
118. For a discussion of corporate criminal liability, see Note, Corporate Crime: Regulating
Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HAv. L. Rav. 1227, 1247-51 (1979).
119. The legislative history did make it clear, however, that the law would not encompass
legitimate commercial disputes over software copying. See S. Rap. No. 268, supra note 19, at 3.
120. The SPA levied $3.9 Million in fines and penalties in 1992. Anti-Piracy Hotline,
supra note 105.
121. Hard Line on Software Piracy, supra note 116.
122. Hatch, supra note 2, at S17,958.
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activity is unlikely to be considered felonious piracy, 123 the potential
reach of the law does not meld with the claim that the law is only for
large-scale pirates.
Although prosecution of individual pirates would not seem prof-
itable for software manufacturers, the SPA is addressing the individual
pirate issue. In an attempt to raise awareness of the law in younger
people, the SPA has produced a rap video entitled "Don't Copy That
Floppy" for distribution to schools around the country.1 4
VIII. CONCLUSION
Software manufacturers are now armed with both civil and crimi-
nal legislation and are voicing an aggressive attitude toward software
pirates of all levels, particularly large-scale pirates. Although the
reach and effectiveness of the new felony legislation for combatting
software piracy will only become clear as pirates at any and every
level are prosecuted, the law's impact maybe felt more quickly than
expected. The SPA reported on the eve of the legislation's passage
that losses due to software piracy had dropped by half since 1990 to
$1.2 billion in 1991,11 a trend that may be attributed in part to the
publicity surrounding the development of the felony legislation.
Despite this success and the recent activity under the new law
directed at large-scale pirates, software copying within corporations
remains, arguably, the most prolific and unmanageable piracy prob-
lem, but corporations are not, ostensibly, a target of the new felony
legislation. Therefore, the law is likely to be only partially successful
at combatting software piracy unless manufacturers can either con-
vince the courts that the new law reaches into the corporate environ-
ment, or flex enough political muscle to ensure future amendments to
the copyright law that give a clear mandate for felony penalties against
corporate pirates.
123. House Considers Penalties, supra note 69.
124. Hard Line on Software Piracy, supra note 116.
125. Kelly, supra, note 19. The reduction in software piracy appears to have been short-
lived. In 1992, worldwide losses to U.S. companies from illegally copied software were esti-
mated at $11 billion, of which $1.9 billion was lost in the U.S. Software Firms Lost $11 Billion
Due to Illegal Copying, Group Says, Pat. Trademark & Copyright L. Daily (BNA) (June 3,
1993).
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